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“Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to 
take you in.” 
— Robert Frost, The Death of the Hired Man, 1914.1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Minnesota statute defines a residential tenant as a person who is 
occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a written or 
oral lease or contract requiring the payment of money or an 
exchange of services.2 In Cocchiarella v. Driggs,3 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court expanded the statutory definition of residential 
tenant by finding someone occupies residential rental property by 
either holding actual physical possession or holding the present 
legal right of possession.4 The Cocchiarella majority repudiated a 
narrower view that the plain meaning of the controlling statutes 
requires actual possession.5 Two housing court referees, a trial court 
judge, three appeals court judges, and even two justices from the 
Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed with the majority’s expansive 
interpretation.6 
While the Cocchiarella majority provided a good outcome to a 
lockout action for one particular tenant victimized by an 
unscrupulous landlord, the court’s opinion expanded the statutory 
definition of residential tenant for all types of landlord-tenant cases 
in Minnesota. 7  Moreover, the majority’s present legal right of 
possession approach used legal fiction by extending the meaning of 
tenancy to any period of time someone holds the right to occupy 
residential rental property, even if they have never physically 
occupied the property. 8  This article (1) advocates a return to a 
narrower actual physical possession requirement–at least as applied 
to lockout actions; (2) touches on how the court’s reasoning 
continued a perilous trend of using dictionaries to surmise plain 
                                                 
1. ROBERT FROST, NORTH OF BOSTON 20 (Henry Holt & Co., 2d ed., reprt. 
1922) (1914). 
2. MINN. STAT. § 504B.001, subd.  12 (2017). 
3. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016). 
4. Id. at 628. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
7. See Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016); MINN. STAT. § 
504B.001, subd. 1 (2017) (stating definitions apply to entire 504B chapter). 
8. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 631 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
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meaning; and (3) explores how the legal fiction of present legal right 
of possession has impacted the practice of law in Minnesota by 
looking at selected cases from the state’s busiest landlord-tenant 
forum, the Hennepin County Housing Court.9 
II.   BACKGROUND 
In Cocchiarella, a tenant looking for a new apartment filled out 
paperwork and paid a security deposit. However, the landlord 
changed his mind several times about when the apartment would be 
ready for the new tenant to move in. Finally growing tired after two 
weeks of waiting, the tenant filed a lockout action claiming the 
landlord unlawfully excluded her from her new apartment, which 
the tenant had never physically occupied. 
This section will begin with a brief overview of self-help 
evictions, discuss what lockout actions look like in Minnesota, and 
explore the details of the Cocchiarella v Driggs lockout action. 
A.  A Quick History of Self-Help Evictions 
“A man's home is his castle – for where shall he be safe if not in 
his house?”10 The home as castle dictum is often cited in support of 
self-defense in criminal law,11 but its context speaks to the need to 
respect the privacy of others so we may all feel safe in our own 
                                                 
9. See JAMES W. HIBBS, ANALYSIS OF THE 2015 POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD 
ESTIMATES  (2016), https://mn.gov/admin/assets/analysis-2015-population-
household-estimates-msdc-nov2016_tcm36-270612.pdf; QuickFacts: 
Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ quickfacts/MN (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2018); QuickFacts: Hennepin County, Minnesota, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/ 
table/hennepincountyminnesota/POP060210 (last visited Feb. 10, 2018) 
(indicating Hennepin County is home to approximately 22% of the entire 
population of the state of Minnesota and Hennepin County contains nearly 30% 
of total rental units in the state). 
10 . JOHN CAMPBELL, THE LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 81 
(James Cockcroft ed.,1894) (quoting Edward Coke, an English barrister and 
judge considered to be one of the greatest Elizabethan and Jacobean era jurists, 
from the Third Institutes of the Lawes of England, part of a set of documents 
which laid the foundation for the development of common law). 
11. See States That Have Stand Your Ground Laws, FINDLAW.COM, 
http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-law-basics/states-that-have-stand-your-
ground-laws.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2018). 
 
3
Moreno: The Problems of Expanding Landlord-Tenant Law in Minnesota Throug
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
58 MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC. [39 
 
homes.12 The act of illegally forcing a tenant out of their home is 
known as lockout, ouster, illegal eviction, or self-help eviction.13 
However, what lies at the center are the illegal actions of a landlord 
in removing a tenant from rental property without resorting to the 
judicial process.14 
Removing a tenant using illegal means can occur by many 
different methods. 15  These methods can include removing the 
tenant’s belongings from the property, 16  changing the locks, 
removing windows or doors, or any other means a perverse mind 
can imagine. 17  Landlords may also illegally cut off or reduce 
essential services like heat, running water, hot water, electricity, or 
gas.18 
Early in the legal history of England and the United States, the 
law was not concerned with how landlords chose to evict tenants. 
Self-help evictions (i.e. lockouts)19 became a “popular and efficient 
method” to get rid of tenants. 20  “However, after centuries of 
                                                 
12. The Meaning and Origin of the Expression: An Englishman's Home is His 
Castle, PHRASES.ORG.UK, http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/an-englishmans-
home-is-his-castle.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2018). 
13. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.107 (NAT’L CONF. OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE. LAWS, 1972); supra note 18, at 856–57. 
14. See Id. 
15. ALVIN L. ARNOLD & MYRON KOVE, 1 REAL ESTATE LEASING PRACTICE 
MANUAL § 38:107 (Oct. 2017). 
16. Bass v. Equity Residential Holdings, LLC, 849 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Minn. 2014) 
(stating that when a tenant returned from work, she discovered the landlord had 
thrown away all her possession into dumpsters filled with water from rain and 
melting snow because she had “abandoned the apartment.”) 
17 . Craig Donofrio, Could These Be the 6 Worst Landlords of All Time? 
REALTOR.COM (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.realtor.com/news/trends/worst-
landlords-ever/ (describing one landlord with a long list of crazy rules tenants had 
to memorize; a landlord so bad, he inspired art; a landlord who tried to disqualify 
current tenants by drastically raising the income requirements; a landlord whose 
lead paint was so bad it formed thick clouds of toxic dust throughout the halls; a 
landlord who removed doors and windows during a cold Boston winter; and two 
landlords who terrorized tenants, including by sawing a hole through the floor of 
an occupied apartment from below). 
18. Shannon Holmberg, Note, Squashing the Squatting Crisis: A Proposal to 
Reform Summary Eviction and Improve Case Management Systems to Stop the 
Squatter Supply, 65 DRAKE L. REV. 839, 857 (2017). See also UNIF. RESIDENTIAL 
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.107. 
19. Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 870 N.W.2d 103, 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015), rev’d 
884. N.W.2d 621 (Minn. 2016). 
20. See Holmberg, supra note 18, at 856–57 (citing infra note 156, at 774–76). 
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unregulated evictions in England, and thereafter in the United 
States, it became clear self-help measures contributed to severe 
abuses by landlords as well as breaches of the peace.”21 Landlords 
who resorted to self-help measures in evicting tenants generated 
such a great risk of confrontation and violence that, since colonial 
times, states’ legislatures and courts have sought to minimize those 
risks by making it so tenants can only be removed from their homes 
peaceably, through the judicial process.22 
Most states have sought to end self-help evictions by enacting 
statutes requiring the use of the judicial process to evict tenants.23 
“Courts refer to cases brought under those statutes as ‘forcible entry 
and detainer’ (FED) or ‘unlawful detainer’ (UD) actions.” 24 
FED/UD actions require landlords to follow a series of formalities 
to obtain a judicial determination allowing them to evict a tenant. 25 
If a landlord does not strictly adhere to the required formalities, 
FED/UD actions also provide judicial remedies to tenants who are 
considered wrongfully ousted. 26  The judicial protections of 
peaceable evictions extend to those who have stopped paying rent,27 
those who hold over property after the end of a lease,28 and even 
those occupying premises illegally, such as squatters or 
trespassers.29 
Today, most jurisdictions in the United States do not allow for 
self-help evictions.30 Many statutes require suing tenants in court, 
waiting for the judicial process to unfold, and waiting for the sheriff 
                                                 
21. See Holmberg, supra note 18, at  856 (citing infra note 156, at 776). 
22. STATE OF CONN. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LANDLORD/TENANT 
DISPUTES POLICE TRAINING MANUAL 4 (2009), http://www.ct.gov/cachm/lib/ 
cachm/Police_manual_-_final_as_adopted_by_State%27s_Attorney.pdf. 




27. Marcia Stewart, Don't Lock Out or Freeze Out a Tenant — It's Illegal, 
NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/lock-out-tenant-illegal-
29799.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2018). 
28. Landlord-Tenant Law: An Overview, CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/landlord-tenant_law (last visited Jan. 13, 
2018). 
29. See Shannon Dunn McCarthy, Squatting: Lifting the Heavy Burden to Evict 
Unwanted Company, 9 U. MASS. L. REV. 156, 174–75. (2013). 
30. Landlord-Tenant Law, supra note 28. 
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to enforce an eviction order. 31  Many jurisdictions recognize a 
separate tort action for unlawful ousters (i.e. self-help evictions) 
and/or criminalize the illegal removal of a tenant. 32  Therefore, 
tenants who are illegally evicted or forced out of their homes enjoy 
many protections against such unlawful, and often volatile, 
conduct.33 
B.  What do Lockout Actions Look Like in Minnesota? 
The illegal act of removing a tenant from their home without 
resorting to the legal process is known as a lockout action in 
Minnesota. 34  Minnesota statutes state that a lockout occurs 
whenever a landlord tries to end a tenancy by: (1) intentionally 
removing or excluding a tenant from the rental property; (2) 
intentionally altering the electrical, heat, gas, or water services; or 
(3) intentionally removing doors, windows, or locks.35  A tenant 
who has been locked out can ask a trial court for an order allowing 
the tenant to retake possession of the rental property.36 A tenant 
starts a lockout action by filing a verified petition at the district court 
in the county where the property is located.37 The petition must: (a) 
describe “the premises and the landlord”; (b) state the specific “facts 
and grounds which demonstrate the exclusion or removal was 
illegal”; (c) state “that no writ of recovery and order to vacate has 
issued”; and (d) ask for possession.38 
Once a lockout petition is properly filed, the action becomes a 
summary proceeding for emergency relief.39 “If it clearly appears 
from the specific grounds and facts stated” in the tenant’s petition 
                                                 
31. Landlord-Tenant Law, supra note 28. 
32. See Stewart, supra note 27. 
33. See Stewart, supra note 27. 
34. Cocchiarella, 870 N.W.2d at 105. 
35. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 1(a) (2017). 
36. Landlords and Tenants: Rights and Responsibilities,  OFF.  MINN. ATT’Y 
GEN. LORI SWANSON, 
https://www.ag.state.mn.us/consumer/handbooks/lt/CH4.asp (last visited Jan. 
19, 2018) [hereinafter Rights and Responsibilities]. 
37. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 1(b). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. § 504B.375, subd. 5. 
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the exclusion was unlawful, the court immediately issues an ex 
parte order for the tenant to have possession of the premises.40 
The ex parte order issued by the court can include several 
important and powerful clauses. Such clauses include: (1) requiring 
the tenant to pay security in an amount the court deems appropriate 
“to pay all costs and damages the landlord may sustain if the order 
is later found to have been obtained wrongfully”;41 (2) directing 
“the sheriff of the county where the premises are located” to execute 
“the order by making an immediate demand for possession on the 
landlord . . . or other person in charge of the premises”; 42  (3) 
directing the sheriff that, “if the landlord does not comply with the 
demand for possession, the officer may render whatever assistance 
may be necessary to immediately place tenant in possession of the 
premises”;43 and (4) directing the sheriff that if the landlord “cannot 
be found, the officer shall immediately enter and  place the . . . 
tenant in possession”.44 The ex parte order may also schedule an 
emergency hearing within a few days.45 At that hearing, the court 
may grant additional relief including monetary damages up to three 
times the tenant’s out-of-pocket costs resulting from the lockout and 
attorney’s fees.46 
Any appeal of the lockout order must be filed within ten days, 
which is one of the shortest deadlines for the filing of an appeal 
allowed under Minnesota law. 47  If a lease includes a provision 
waiving the right to file a lockout action, such provision is void.48 
The protections against unlawful lockouts extend to tenants 
occupying property after a mortgage foreclosure or contract-for-
                                                 
40. Id. § 504B.375, subd. 1(c). 
41. Id. § 504B.375, subd. 1(d). 
42. Id. § 504B.375, subd. 1(e). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. See Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 36. 
46. Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 36. 
47. Compare Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 3 (2017) (stating an appeal of a 
lockout order must be filed within 10 days), with Minn.  R. Civ. App. P. 104.01 
(providing that, unless a different time is given in the controlling statute, the usual 
timeline for the filing of an appeal in a civil action is 60 days). 
48. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 4 (2017).  
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deed cancellation.49 Any landlord who commits a lockout is also 
guilty of a misdemeanor.50 
C.  The Cocchiarella v. Driggs Lockout Action 
In late January 2014, Mary Cocchiarella saw a “for rent” sign 
and contacted Donald Driggs, who informed her three units were 
available to rent.51 While viewing the units, Cocchiarella noticed 
Driggs had personal property inside the unit Cocchiarella was 
interested in renting.52 Despite presently occupying that particular 
unit, Driggs agreed to rent it to Cocchiarella.53 
On February 1, 2014, Cocchiarella met Driggs to fill out an 
application and ask when she could begin to move in.54 Driggs said 
it would take a couple of days because he needed to varnish the 
floors.55 Cocchiarella again met Driggs on February 3, 2014, and 
paid $2,400 in cash as her security deposit and first month’s rent.56 
Driggs informed Cocchiarella the unit was not yet ready because he 
was ill, so he asked her to come back the next day.57 
When Cocchiarella returned the following day, Driggs asked her 
to obtain a co-signer. 58  Cocchiarella returned later that same 
evening with a roommate, who filled out a rental application. Driggs 
informed them he needed a couple of days to remove his belongings 
before they could move in.59 Two days later, Cocchiarella and her 
roommate returned to ask Driggs when they could move in. 60 
Driggs became angry and demanded they leave.61 
                                                 
49. Id. § 504B.375, subdiv.at subd. 6;. sSee also MINN. LEGAL SERVS. COAL, 




50. Minn. Stat. §§ 504B.225 (2017), . See also Minn. Stat. § 609.606 (2017). 
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On February 10, 2014, Driggs left Cocchiarella a voicemail 
asking her to return to the apartment so Driggs could return her 
money. 62  After meeting Cocchiarella, Driggs again changed his 
mind.63 This time, Driggs said he needed a couple of days to remove 
his belongings so they could move in later that week.64 
On February 11, 2014, Cocchiarella left Driggs a voicemail 
saying that unless he provided her keys for immediate move-in, she 
would file a lockout petition with the court.65 Driggs did not give 
Cocchiarella the keys, so Cocchiarella filed a lockout petition.66 
Two different housing court referees declined to grant 
Cocchiarella’s lockout petition for lack of standing.67 The referees 
found Cocchiarella lacked standing because only a residential 
tenant may bring a lockout action. 68  As defined by statute, a 
residential tenant is a person who is occupying residential premises 
and Cocchiarella had never actually moved in.69 
A district court judge reached the same conclusion and affirmed 
the housing court’s findings.70 A three-judge panel of the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion and affirmed the 
district court’s findings.71 Only when the case got to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court did the issue become murky. 
The Cocchiarella majority found the plain meaning of 
residential tenant extended to anyone holding a present legal right 
of possession, even if they had never physically occupied the rental 
property. 72  The majority’s interpretation relied on different 
dictionaries to find the plain meaning of ‘occupying’ blended with 






67. See generally id. at 622–24; Petition for Hearing, Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 
27-CV-HC-14-967 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Feb. 14, 2014); Order-other, 
Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 27-CV-HC-14-967 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed May 
1, 2014). 
68. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 623. 
69. Id. 
70. Bob Collins, Justice is Blind, but it Can Read a Dictionary, MPR NEWS 
CRIME AND JUST. BLOG (Sep. 8, 2015, 10:35 AM), http://blogs.mprnews.org/ 
newscut/2015/09/justice-is-blind-but-it-can-read-a-dictionary/. 
71. See supra note 70. 
72. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 627–28. 
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technical meaning within landlord-tenant law. 73  Because of this 
blended meaning, a residential tenant is now defined as anyone who 
either physically occupies rental premises or has a present legal 
right of possession.74 
III.   ANALYSIS 
Minnesota statute defines a residential tenant as a person who is 
occupying a dwelling in a residential building under a written or 
oral lease or contract requiring the payment of money or an 
exchange of services.75 The crux of the Cocchiarella case became 
what does it mean to ‘occupy’ a residential dwelling? 
A.  Why Didn’t the Court Heed the Warnings from Within Its Own 
Chambers? 
Writing in dissent of the Cocchiarella majority, Justice 
Anderson pointed out that Cocchiarella did not have a written lease 
and, more importantly, did not even have any agreement about a 
move-in date or the effective date of any lease agreement.76 Under 
his narrower interpretation, a residential tenancy begins at actual 
possession.77 This means that to occupy is defined as the moment 
actual physical occupancy begins. This was the same interpretation 
that every judicial officer below also adopted and found to be 
mandated by the plain meaning of the word ‘occupying.’78 
By contrast, the majority disposed of the lack of agreements by 
applying the presumption that, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, 
all facts alleged in the complaint are accepted as true and construe 
all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of Cocchiarella, 
as the nonmoving party. 79  The dissent also concedes this 
presumption binds him to consider the matter as if there was an oral 
lease.80 Under the majority’s broader interpretation, a residential 
tenancy starts the moment actual physical occupancy begins and 
                                                 
73. Id. at 625–26. 
74. Id. 
75. Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd.  12 (2017). 
76. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 629 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
77. Id. at 631 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
78. Id. at 628 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. at 622-24. 
80. Id. at 629, fn. 1 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
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also extends to anytime someone holds present legal right of 
possession even if they have never lived there.81 
Justice Anderson warned the majority their broader 
interpretation can introduce a host of potential problems, especially 
when several people claim to hold the present legal right of 
possession.82 These warnings only scratched the surface of potential 
problems as will be discussed in more detail later. What becomes 
apparent from comparing the reasoning of the Cocchiarella 
majority and dissent is that the Court was interpreting statutory 
language to find whether ‘occupying’ starts at actual possession or 
extends to the moment someone holds the present legal right of 
possession. 
B.  What has the Legislature Said About Plain Meaning and the 
Intent of Lockout Actions?  
In Minnesota, Chapter 645 controls the interpretation of 
language contained in statutes and rules.83 When certain words and 
phrases have a specific meaning written into a statute by the 
legislature, that definition controls. 84  A specific meaning of 
residential tenant was written into a statute by the legislature. 
Residential tenant is defined as a person who is occupying a 
dwelling in a residential building under a written or oral lease or 
contract requiring the payment of money or an exchange of 
services.85 However, there is no statutory definition to the word 
‘occupying.’  
If there is no specific meaning written into a statute by the 
legislature, words and phrases are construed according to rules of 
grammar and according to their common and approved usage.86  
However, technical words and phrases and such others as have 
acquired a special meaning, are construed according to such special 
meaning or definition.87 Occupying was construed by the dissent 
and every other judicial officer below according to its common and 
                                                 
81. Id. at 631 (Anderson, J., dissenting). 
82. Id. at 633 (Anderson J., dissenting) (noting Cocchiarella sought a similar 
remedy to force Driggs out). 
83. Minn. Stat. ch. 645 (2017). 
84. Minn. Stat. § 645.01, subd. 1 (2017). 
85. Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 12 (2017). 
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approved usage.88 They believed that to occupy residential property 
means that you must have actual physical possession of the 
property. I believe this interpretation is correct because it is the 
meaning innately assigned to the word ‘occupying,’ as was 
evidenced by every judicial officer from the lower courts 
unanimously adopting such an interpretation. However, the 
Cocchiarella majority disagreed and found ‘occupying’ had 
acquired a special meaning which extended to the legal right of 
occupancy, even if you had no physical possession. 
The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to 
ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature and to give 
effect to all its provisions.89 When the words of a law are clear and 
free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law is not to be disregarded 
under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.90 A statute is ambiguous only 
when it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.91 If a 
statute is not ambiguous, the words of the statute should be 
interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meaning.92 
To support their conflicting interpretations of the word 
‘occupying,’ all of the justices of the Minnesota Supreme Court 
reached for their dictionaries and found support for their particular 
viewpoint. However, none of the justices ever found that any part 
of the statute in question was ambiguous. If the statute was not 
found to be ambiguous, then why use dictionaries to define a word 
or reach a particular interpretation? This question is more vexing 
considering how both interpretations of ‘occupying’ are argued to 
be reasonable by the majority and the dissent of the Cocchiarella 
opinion. 
The statutes involved in a lockout petition clearly state that only 
tenants who are occupying an apartment have standing,93 yet there 
is no statutory definition of what it means to occupy.  However, as 
Justice Anderson pointed out in dissent, the legislature did express 
their specific intent with regards to lockout actions.94 The lockout 
statute states its specific purpose is to provide an additional and 
                                                 
88. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 628, 633 (Anderson J., dissenting). 
89. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2017). 
90. Id. 
91. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 629 (Anderson J., dissenting). 
92. Id. 
93. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 12 (2017). 
94. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 632 (Anderson J., dissenting). 
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summary remedy for residential tenants unlawfully excluded or 
removed from rental property.95 That means a lockout action is not 
the only remedy available to tenants those who lose their security 
deposit to unscrupulous landlords, such as Cocchiarella, because 
they can pursue other remedies such as a conciliation claim or a civil 
suit.96 While those options may lead to a longer, more difficult road, 
this was the intent of the legislature. 
A lockout was meant, by the legislature, as an extraordinary 
remedy only for those few who have been living somewhere but are 
unlawfully locked out by their landlords. The majority’s broad 
interpretation renders the purpose of the lockout statute 
meaningless.  More confoundingly, the majority argues legislative 
intent cannot be explored because the statute is not ambiguous,97  
yet the majority also engages in interpretation of the statute’s 
language, which should only be done to resolve an ambiguity.98 
C.  How Often are Dictionaries Used by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to Determine Plain Meaning? 
Judge Harold Leventhal once said, and Justice Scalia has 
repeated, the use of legislative history is “the equivalent of entering 
a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests 
for one's friends,” allowing judges to pick the evidence that best 
supports their policy preferences.99 The use of dictionaries, too, can 
be manipulated in this manner as the problems include arbitrary and 
arguably even biased selection of dictionaries by judges, lack of 
determination about the qualifications of a particular dictionary, and 
failure to account for context when using a dictionary to define a 
single term. 100  The renowned jurist Judge Learned Hand once 
cautioned about using dictionaries in judicial decision-making: 
Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, 
are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of 
interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, 
                                                 
95. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 5 (2017). 
96. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson J., dissenting). 
97. Id. at 628, fn. 5. 
98. Id. at 624. 
99. Phillip Rubin, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in 
Accordance With Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J. 167,168 (2010). 
100. See supra note 99. 
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or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature 
and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the 
dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some 
purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and 
imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning.101 
No matter how well respected a jurist, nor how noble a warning, 
Judge Hand’s eloquent words of wisdom have fallen upon deaf ears. 
Over the last three decades, the United States Supreme Court's use 
of dictionaries in its published opinions has increased 
dramatically. 102  Although the Court has consulted dictionaries 
almost since its inception, before 1864, the Court used dictionaries 
as authorities only three times.103 In the quarter-century between 
1958 and 1983, the Court cited dictionaries 125 times—an average 
of only five times per term.104 
By alarming contrast, in the six Terms between 1987 and 1992, 
the Court has never cited dictionaries fewer than fifteen times per 
term, hitting a high point of thirty-two references during the 1992 
Term alone. 105  Dictionary definitions appeared in twenty-eight 
percent of the 107 Supreme Court cases decided by published 
opinion in the 1992 Term—a fourteen-fold increase over the 1981 
Term. 106  The Court has referred to twenty-seven different 
dictionaries since 1988 in cases involving not only statutes, but also 
constitutional provisions and administrative codes.107 
Closer to home, our local court of last resort, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, used dictionaries in 30 108  out of 108 published 
opinions in 2015, 109  in 30 110  out of 124 published opinions in 
                                                 
101. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945). 
102. See supra note 99 p. 168 (citing infra note 104 pp. 1438–42 (detailing the 
increased reliance by the Supreme Court on dictionaries, focusing in particular 
on the 1988–1992 Terms)). 
103. See supra note 99 p.168. 
104 . Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1994). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 1438-9. 
108 . https://1.next.westlaw.com (search “dictionary” then apply filter for 
Minnesota Supreme Court then sort by date) (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).  
109. 2015 MINN. JUD. BRANCH. ANN. REP. 52. 
110. See supra note 108. 
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2016,111  and in 29112  out of 104 published opinions in 2017.113 
These statistics illustrate the Minnesota Supreme Court uses 
dictionaries to support its reasoning in 25-30% of its written 
opinions.114 This ratio falls closely in line with the United States 
Supreme Court’s use of dictionaries.115 
Even just within the Cocchiarella opinion, the majority used 
two dictionaries to support their conclusions while the dissent used 
five, including a newer version of one dictionary cited by the 
majority.116 As discussed earlier, all of the justices reached for their 
dictionaries to find support for their conflicting interpretations of 
the word ‘occupying.’ Importantly, the justices did so without 
declaring any statutory language to be ambiguous, even though they 
advanced two distinct definitions which each side argued to be more 
reasonable than the other. 
The legislature requires that when the words of a law are not 
explicit, the intent of the legislature may be ascertained by 
considering (1) the occasion and necessity for the law; (2) the 
circumstances under which it was enacted; (3) the mischief to be 
remedied; (4) the object to be attained; (5) the former law, if any; 
(6) the consequences of a particular interpretation; (7) the 
contemporaneous legislative history; and (8) the legislative and 
administrative interpretations of the statute. 117  Notably missing 
from this list are dictionaries. There is nothing wrong, per se, with 
using dictionaries to identify the general outlines of word meanings 
and then relying on contextual arguments from text, structure, 
history, or policy to determine which meaning is appropriate.118 
                                                 
111. 2016 MINN. JUD. BRANCH. ANN. REP. 53. 
112. See supra note 108. 
113. 2017 MINN. JUD. BRANCH. ANN. REP. 54. 
114. Calculated using only the numbers cited in the sentence immediately 
preceding this one. 
115. See supra note 104. 
116. Compare Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 625-6 (pointing to the American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000) and Black’s Law 
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)), with Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 629-31 (Anderson 
J., dissenting) (pointing to a newer edition of the American Heritage Dictionary 
of the English Language (5th ed. 2011), amongst others)). 
117. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2017). 
118. See supra note 104 at 1452. 
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However, the use of dictionaries should be at the beginning, rather 
than at the end of the interpretive process.119 
To be fair, the majority correctly went further in their analysis 
than the dictionary definitions. However, as Justice Anderson points 
out in dissent, ‘occupying’ is hardly a technical or legalistic word, 
whose common and ordinary meaning is easily discerned.120 More 
troubling, the majority incorrectly relied on a common law meaning 
and the dictionary definition of ‘tenancy’ to support its broader 
interpretation that ‘occupying’ had acquired a technical meaning.121 
Because residential tenant is defined by statute, the court needed to 
look no further than the statutory definition, as the lower courts 
correctly restrained themselves to do, to determine whether a 
residential tenancy exists, including what it means to ‘occupy.’122 
The only exception is when a particular term was found to be 
ambiguous, which no justice found to be the case in Cocchiarella. 
D.  Can’t the Minnesota Supreme Court Just do What It Wants?  
As a court of last resort, the Minnesota Supreme Court possesses 
powers not delegated to courts below.123 However, even the powers 
of the highest court in Minnesota are bound by rules, such as those 
which inform others of when the court may hear a case. 124  In 
Cocchiarella, there were no differences of opinion below which 
required the Minnesota Supreme Court’s guidance, whether at the 
housing court, the reviewing district court, or the court of appeals.125 
The Court is empowered to hear cases under broad authority 
because it serves as the final guardian of the state constitution.126 
However, at least in Cocchiarella, the Court did not make it clear 
why this case was reviewed. If the Court wanted to provide 
                                                 
119. Id. 
120. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 630-31 (Anderson J., dissenting). 
121. Id. at 631 (Anderson J., dissenting). 
122. Id. 
123. Minn. Const. art. VI § 2. 
124. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 117, subd. 2. 
125. Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 628 (Anderson J., dissenting). 
126. Minnesota Supreme Court, MNCOURTS.GOV, Informational Brochure, 
January 2018, http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/ 
CIOMediaLibrary/DocumentLibrary/SupremeCourt.pdf53. 
https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/map/TheImportanceofPrecedent.html. (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2018). 
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Cocchiarella with a fair outcome, why not just come out and say so? 
The Court has tools at their disposal to help it support a narrow 
decision, such as relying on their constitutional authority as a co-
equal branch of government to interpret what the laws mean127 or 
by issuing an order opinion.128 
No matter what their purpose was, the opinion of the five 
members of the Cocchiarella majority trumped that of three district 
court judicial officers, three appellate court judicial officers, and 
two supreme court judicial officers with similar backgrounds, 
training, and experience who had also looked at the same laws and 
found there was no standing unless you had physically occupied the 
premises. 129  Of particular note is that amongst these were two 
housing court referees, experts in landlord-tenant law and related 
issues, who both reached the same conclusion.130 
The direction coming from courts of review should be clear and 
consistent, so all below can anticipate how future controversies will 
be resolved.131 Trial courts are bound by the same principle to a 
lesser extent since their decisions are not binding precedent for other 
courts. Trial courts also depend on courts of review to provide solid, 
detailed reasoning. This is because lower courts are duty-bound to 
give full effect to opinions descending from higher courts and there 
is often no mechanism delineated for implementation of the higher 
court’s opinion. Moreover, the words from a court of review opinion 
are carefully parsed by attorneys, litigants, the media, and the 
public. The higher courts’ opinions will impact the practice of law 
before the lower court where the case on review originated. The 
                                                 
127. See Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham, 486 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1992) 
(ruling, en banc without oral argument, that a statute was unconstitutional because 
it encroached on the judiciary’s power to decide who may properly practice law 
before the courts of this state, a power vested solely upon the judiciary by the 
Minnesota Constitution). 
128. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136, subd. 1. 
129. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 628-33. (5-2 decision) (Anderson, J. 
dissenting). 
130. See Minn. Stat. § 484.013, subd. 1(a) (2017) (stating that the purpose of 
the housing court program is to ensure continuity and consistency in the 
disposition of landlord-tenant law cases); see also Id., subd. 3 (requiring a 
housing court referees to be learned in landlord-tenant law). 
131. Edward Richards, The Importance of Precedent, LSU LAW CENTER, (last 
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more uncertain the reasoning of a court of review opinion, the 
greater the potential for harm in trying to implement those opinions 
in courts below. 
There were several alternatives to using dictionaries which 
would have provided more solid reasoning. For example, the Court 
could have found current Minnesota law doesn’t resolve the 
question before the Court, but other states have resolved similar 
questions and adopted their reasoning.132 The Court could have also 
relied on national resources such as URLTA 133  which aim to 
standardize housing laws. There is greater predictability achieved 
by these alternatives because we can look to other stable sources of 
law and search them for support in adopting a new legal principle 
in Minnesota. 
To be fair, Minnesota is not the only state to define occupancy 
as either actual possession or present legal right of possession.134 
But one of the greater problems with the reasoning in Cocchiarella 
is not only the direction the law was moved but also the way it was 
moved and its effect on predictability. In the past, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has not been coy about adopting new legal 
principles from model codes but rejecting specific provisions,135 
                                                 
132. See Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1973) (analyzing how other 
jurisdictions handled an issue which was of first impression before the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in what turned out to be a landmark landlord-tenant opinion which 
still strongly anchors housing law practice today regarding the covenants of 
habitability and when a tenant is excused from owing rent). 
133. See UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 1.301 (defining 
tenant), 2.103 (comment), (last visited Jan. 13, 2018), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/residential%20landlord%20and%20te
nant/urlta%201974.pdf (providing support for the conclusions the Cocchiarella 
majority ultimately reached by defining tenant as “a person entitled under a rental 
agreement to occupy a dwelling unit to the exclusion of others” and by explaining 
it is possible both landlord and tenant may have the [simultaneous] right of action 
against third parties wrongfully in possession of premises by summary 
proceedings, where appropriate). 
134. P.A. Agabin, Annotation, Right of Landlord Legally Entitled to Possession 
to Dispossess Tenant Without Legal Process IV. Remedies of Tenant, 6 A.L.R.3d 
177 (Originally published in 1966). 
135. See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Mens Rea in Minnesota and the Model Penal 
Code, (2013) Symposium: 50th Anniversary of the Minnesota Criminal Code-
Looking Back and Looking Forward. Paper 4. (discussing how the 1963 Model 
Penal Code’s mens rea section was one of its most significant innovations, yet 
Minnesota has refused to adopt it). 
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adopting other states’ legal principles but carving out nuances,136 or 
rejecting its long-standing legal principles.137  However, in those 
opinions, the Court gave well-founded reasons for each movement 
of the law. By contrast, the majority’s reasoning in Cocchiarella 
was squarely anchored on dictionaries to justify the introduction of 
a new legal fiction — that someone who never lived in an apartment 
is still occupying that apartment. 
E.  A Quick Word on Legal Fictions 
To borrow reasoning from the Cocchiarella majority, Merriam-
Webster defines legal fiction as “something assumed in law to be 
fact irrespective of the truth or accuracy of that assumption.”138 
However, Encyclopedia Britannica Online gives a more contextual 
definition: “legal fiction is a rule assuming as true something that is 
clearly false. A fiction is often used to get around the provisions of 
constitutions and legal codes that legislators are hesitant to change 
. . .”139 Black’s Law Dictionary is not as helpful, but cites some 
interesting literature: 
 “I . . . employ the expression ‘Legal Fiction’ to signify any 
assumption which conceals . . . the fact that a rule of law has 
undergone alteration, its letter remaining unchanged, its operation 
being modified . . . it is not difficult to understand why fictions in all 
their forms are particularly congenial to the infancy of society. They 
satisfy the desire for improvement, which is not quite wanting, at the 
same time that they do not offend the superstitious disrelish for 
change which is always present.” Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law 21–
22 (17th ed. 1901). 
 
 “Legal fiction is the mask that progress must wear to pass the faithful 
but blear-eyed watchers of our ancient legal treasures. But though 
                                                 
136. See Dickhoff ex rel. Dickhoff v. Green, 836 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2013) 
(adopting loss of chance doctrine as a measure of damages, rather than through 
relaxed causation, after seemingly rejecting the same doctrine outright— in any 
form— just 10 years earlier in Fabio v. Bellomo, 504 N.W.2d 758 (Minn. 1993)). 
137. See Bode v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 612 N.W.2d 862 (Minn. 2000) 
(rejecting the long-standing requirement that a court must dismiss a case for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction in favor of a “modern view”). 
138. Legal Fiction, Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/legal/legal%20fiction (last visited on Feb. 8. 2018). 
139. Legal Fiction, Encyclopedia Brittanica Online, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/legal-fiction (last visited on Mar. 31. 2018). 
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legal fictions are useful in thus mitigating or absorbing the shock of 
innovation, they work havoc in the form of intellectual confusion.” 
Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order 126 (1933).140 
Professor Peter J. Smith defines legal fictions as false statements 
by a court, not intended to deceive, but necessary in the age of 
common law to temper the disruptive effect of changes in legal 
doctrine. 141  The new legal fiction adopted by the majority’s 
reasoning in Cocchiarella — that someone who never lived in an 
apartment is still occupying that apartment — was also not meant 
to deceive.  However, many of the latent purposes for employing 
the use of legal fiction enumerated in this section seem to apply. 
F.  So Dictionaries and Legal Fiction Aside, Why is Determining 
Present Legal Right of Possession a Problem? 
The process involved in determining present legal right of 
possession in a lockout action requires trial courts to read the 
petition and make an immediate determination. 142  This initial 
determination must be without hearing or testimony.143 The Court 
must find whether the landlord or the tenant currently holds the 
present legal right to control/occupy the rental property.144 At first 
glance, this process seems similar to the steps trial courts are already 
performing in their most common type of landlord-tenant cases: 
eviction actions.145 However, lockout actions are markedly different 
from eviction actions in at least one significant way. Eviction 
actions start with the issuance of a summons 146  which must be 
served on the opposing parties following strict compliance with 
                                                 
140. Legal Fiction, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014). 
141. Peter J. Smith, Faculty Scholarship, New Legal Fiction, 95 GEO L. J. 1435, 
1437 (2007) (providing an excellent analysis of the modern use of legal fictions 
in an age of positive law). 
142. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 1(c) (2017). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145 . See Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 4 (2017) (defining eviction as a 
summary proceeding whose sole purpose trial court’s interpret to be to determine 
only the extant possessory rights to property). 
146. See Id. 
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procedures147 and then the parties must wait for an initial hearing 
before the merits of the case will be weighed.  By contrast, lockout 
actions start by weighing the merits of the case, before service or 
opportunity to be heard is given to the opposing party.148 
While trial court judicial officers are trained, skilled, and 
experienced in making such difficult, immediate decisions, even 
trial courts need to moor all decision-making upon solid ground for 
“public institutions and the State are legitimate to the extent that 
their decisions are justified by reasons.”149 To help illustrate the 
time limitations placed on judicial officers in making such 
decisions, here is a joke. 
Three judges go on a duck hunt together: an appellate court 
judge, a Supreme Court justice, and a trial court judge. First, the 
appellate court judge sees what looks like a bird approaching. 
Before taking a shot, the appellate court judge wanted to look at a 
treatise to be sure it was a duck — but by the time he found the 
answer, the duck was out of range. The Supreme Court justice saw 
the next bird, but wanted to confer with colleagues and research the 
available precedents before shooting — unfortunately, by then the 
duck was long gone. Suddenly, the trial court judge heard what he 
thought was a bird and immediately aimed and fired. “I sure hope 
that was a duck!” he exclaimed.150 
Some say there is a grain of truth to every joke. One of the truths 
the duck joke illustrates is that trial courts, by design, make 
decisions much faster than courts of review and, often, without as 
much time to contemplate each case or anyone’s citation to legal 
precedent.151 Embedded within the fast proceedings of trial courts, 
                                                 
147. Koski v. Johnson, 837 N.W.2d 739, (Minn. Ct. App. 2013) (review denied) 
(finding statute governing service of process in eviction actions requires strict 
compliance, not merely substantial compliance). 
148. Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 1(c). 
149. See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A 
Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483. 485 (2015) (delving 
deeply into the underlying analyses, contrasting philosophies, and practical 
problems judges face when choosing whether and how much to explain). 
150. Judge Mel Dickstein, How Judges Make Decisions, MinnPost (Sep. 9, 
2014), https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2014/09/how-judges-
make-decisions. 
151. See supra note 150. See also supra note 111 pp. 26, 51, 53 (reporting 
1,292,494 cases were filed in trial courts throughout Minnesota’s 87 counties and 
decided by their 346 judicial officers; 1,963 petitions for review were filed in the 
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certain specialized (or ad hoc) courts were created to address 
specific subject matters.152 In 1989,153 two such specialized courts 
were created in each of Minnesota’s two most populous counties154 
to expeditiously resolve housing issues using summary 
proceedings. 155  Both the creation and use of ad-hoc courts and 
summary proceedings to quickly resolve landlord-tenant cases 
follows a modern nationwide trend. 156 This modern trend emerged 
to disincentivize landlords from pursuing self-help evictions.157 
Minnesota’s two specialized housing courts serve Hennepin and 
Ramsey Counties158 and together handle about half of the state’s 
landlord-tenant law cases.159 The two housing courts operate under 
a special subset of court rules (known as the housing court rules) 
which only apply to landlord-tenant proceedings held in those two 
ad-hoc courts. 160 In order to expedited housing court cases further, 
the housing court rules waive many rules of court and civil 
procedure, such as allowing non-attorney agents to represent others 
                                                 
state’s single court of appeals and decided by its 19 judges; and 765 petitions for 
review were filed in the state’s single supreme court and decided by its 7 officers); 
Sep. 2017 MINN. JUD. BRANCH. PERFORMANCE MEASURES ANN. REP. (reporting 
how quickly the three levels of Minnesota courts disposed of their cases); but see 
Minnesota Court of Appeals, MINN. JUD. BRANCH 
http://www.mncourts.gov/CourtOfAppeals.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2018) 
(explaining the 90-day deadline for Court of Appeals opinions is the shortest 
deadline imposed on any appellate court in the nation). 
152 . Minn. Stat. ch. 484 (2017) (controlling district court operations and 
creating, for example, an expedited child support hearing process, family courts, 
housing courts, and misdemeanor violation bureaus). 
153 . Rachel S. Lipkin, When the Poor Face Housing Court, CENTER FOR 
URBAN AND REGIONAL AFFAIRS, 7, (last visited Jan. 20, 2018), 
http://www.cura.umn.edu/sites/cura.advantagelabs.com/files/publications/23-4-
Lipkin.pdf. 
154. Minnesota State Demographic Center, Key Findings, MN.GOV (Apr. 1, 
201), https://mn.gov/admin/demography/data-by-topic/population-data/our-
estimates/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2017). 
155. Minn. Stat. § 484.013, subd. 3 (2017). 
156. Randy Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary 
Eviction Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 759, 785-6 (1994). 
157. Id. 
158. Minn. Stat. § 484.013, subd. 1 (2017); Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 601. 
159. See 2x4 Report, March 2016, MINN. HOUSING P’SHIP, 
http://www.mhponline.org/images/stories/docs/research/2x4/2x4-Tabloid-
2016_Letter_Final.pdf. 
160. See Minn. Gen. R. Prac. 601-612. 
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and allowing any motion to be made orally, including on the day of 
trial.161 Owing in no small part to the use of ad-hoc courts, summary 
proceedings, and the housing court rules, most housing court cases 
are closed within 14 days of filing.162 More than 90% of housing 
court cases are consistently closed within 30 days, 97% within 60, 
and 99% within 120.163 Such lightning-quick litigation, embedded 
within the already fast proceedings of Minnesota’s trial courts,164 
stretches the strength of the Cocchiarella majority’s reasoning to its 
limits. 
G.  Impact on the Practice of Landlord-Tenant Law as Seen 
Through Hennepin County Housing Court 
Hennepin County Housing Court serves as the forum for 
landlord-tenant cases in Minnesota’s most populous county.165 Not 
surprisingly, Hennepin County also contains the most residential 
housing rental units of any county in the state.166  “Housing market 
analysts generally consider a vacancy rate of 5% of rental units to 
be a healthy level, allowing for sufficient choice for renters and 
allowing turnover to proceed smoothly at a normal rate. Vacancy 
rates in a majority of Minnesota communities are below this level, 
even falling below 1% in some markets.”167 In the second quarter 
of 2015, the apartment vacancy rate in the Minneapolis metropolitan 
area was 2.7 percent and the average asking rent was $1,077 per 
                                                 
161. See Id. 603, 610. 
162. 2016 MINNEAPOLIS INNOVATION EVICTIONS REP. 21. 
163. Id. 
164. Bill Hudson, Cameras Capture the Fast Pace of Minn. Housing Court, 
WCCO CBS MINNESOTA (May 23, 2012, 6:48 PM), 
http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2012/05/23/cameras-capture-the-fast-pace-of-
minn-housing-court/. 
165. See supra note 159 (reporting 18,280 evictions filed in Minnesota in 
2015); 2017 SECOND JUD. D. HOUSING CT. REP. OF OPPORTUNITIES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (reporting an average of 3,000 evictions per year have 
been filed in recent years in Ramsey County); See also supra note 162 p. 22 
(reporting 6,061 eviction cases were filed in Hennepin County in 2015). 
166. Id. 
167. Karen Spitzfaden, Review and Summary of Local Housing Studies, (Dec. 
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month.168 Affordable housing, in particular, is in desperately short 
supply and the problem has worsened.169 Therefore, the residential 
rental market in Hennepin County is primed with incentives to keep 
rental properties occupied, costs be damned. 
1. Potential abuses when a tenant is about to be legally evicted. 
A tenant will lose the present legal right of possession if they do 
not prevail in an eviction action. There are many reasons landlords 
could file eviction actions and the possible defenses greatly 
outnumber the basis for eviction actions. 170  However, evictions 
alleging nonpayment of rent are by far the most common.171 
In a nonpayment of rent eviction action, a tenant has a right to 
pay the money owed to the landlord, or redeem the tenancy, at any 
time before possession is legally delivered to the landlord.172 The 
Minnesota courts of review have found the right of a tenant to 
redeem the tenancy is foreclosed upon issuance of an order for writ 
of recovery. 173  This means a tenant may no longer redeem the 
tenancy once a writ has been issued by the court. This principle 
creates a situation where a tenant is still occupying the property, the 
tenant has lost the right to redeem the tenancy, but the clock is 
ticking until the sheriff executes the writ of recovery and restores 
landlord to actual possession of the property. While this principle 
                                                 
168. Gabriel Labovitz, Housing Market Profiles, (July 1, 2015), U.S. DEP’T 
OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV. 
https://www.huduser.gov/periodicals/USHMC/reg/MinneapolisMN_HMP_July
15.pdf. 
169. Kelly Smith, New Effort Aims to Save Affordable Housing in Hennepin 
County, Metro Area, STAR TRIBUNE (June 18, 2016, 1:12 PM), 
http://www.startribune.com/new-effort-aims-to-save-affordable-housing-in-
hennepin-county-metro-area/383489061/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2018). 
170. Lawrence McDonough, Residential Eviction Defense and Tenant Claims 
in Minnesota, Sixteenth Edition, (Jan. 2018), 
http://povertylaw.homestead.com/files/Reading/Residential_Eviction_Defense_i
n_Minnesota.htm (providing an exhaustive and excellent resource for 
understanding which defenses are apposite to the different basis for evictions). 
171. Alan F. Pendleton, Housing Court-Evictions: 12 Basic Rules Every Judge 
Must Know, MINN. JUD. TRAINING UPDATE (Nov. 21 2014), 
https://blogpendleton.files.wordpress.com/2014/11/judicial-training-update-14-
22.pdf. 
172. Minn. Stat. § 504B.291, subd. 1(a) (2017). 
173. Paul McCusker and Associates, Inc. v. Omodt, 359 N.W.2d 747, 748 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (review denied). 
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only speaks directly to a tenant’s right to redeem the tenancy, does 
this also mean a tenant loses present legal right of possession after 
a writ of recovery is issued? More importantly, doesn’t this 
principle place tenants at risk of being victimized by vindictive 
landlords174 who may argue that such a tenant may have lost present 
legal right of possession?175 
This was the set of circumstances presented by the case of Jones 
v. Meldahl.176 In Jones v. Meldahl, a tenant filed an emergency 
petition under the tenant remedies act177 alleging the landlord shut 
off the heat to force her to move out of the unit.178 When the tenant’s 
attorney contacted the landlord, the landlord denied knowing the 
tenant or that she lived there. 179  During the initial hearing, 
Landlord’s attorney moved for dismissal on the basis tenant no 
longer had a present legal right of possession because a Writ of 
Recovery had issued on October 30, 2017, in an eviction action.180 
Landlord relied on the premise that “possession is delivered . . . 
when the court issues an order dispossessing the tenant and 
permitting reentry by the landlord.”181 While the court did not find 
landlord’s argument persuasive,182 and ultimately found landlord’s 
conduct was unlawful because he did not resort to the judicial 
process to terminate tenant’s leasehold interest,183 this illustrates 
just one of the many ways savvy attorneys will wield the words 
passed down to us from courts of review in ways that will help their 
clients. 
                                                 
174. See supra note 17. 
175. Id. 
176. Jones v. Meldahl, 27-CV-HC-17-5286 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 
6, 2017). 
177. Minn. Stat. § 504B.381 (2017). 
178. Petition for Emergency Relief Under Tenant Remedies Act at 2, Jones v. 
Meldahl, 27-CV-HC-17-5286 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 6, 2017). 
179. Id. 
180. Decision and Order on Petition for Emergency Relief Under Minn. Stat. § 
504B.381 at 3, Jones v. Meldahl, 27-CV-HC-17-5286 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. 
filed Nov. 22, 2017). 
181. Id. (citing Omodt, 359 N.W.2d at 748). 
182. Decision and Order on Petition for Emergency Relief Under Minn. Stat. § 
504B.381 at 4, Jones v. Meldahl, 27-CV-HC-17-5286 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. 
filed Nov. 22, 2017). 
183. Id. at 5, (citing Berg v. Wiley, 264 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Minn. 1978)). 
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2. What if the right to deliver present legal right of possession is 
missing? 
Sometimes a landlord does not actually hold present legal right 
of possession to deliver to a tenant, but the tenant does not know 
that and sometimes neither does the landlord. 
a. When the tenant is unaware that present legal right of possession 
did not transfer to them. 
In Wilson v. Doe,184 a landlord filed an eviction against two 
unknown occupants of a rental dwelling alleging no lease between 
the parties ever existed.185 The tenant filed an answer alleging she 
did not know the plaintiff to be the landlord of the property and the 
real landlord had provided her with a written lease and receipts of 
rent paid.186 Following a court trial, the court found: (1) plaintiff 
was the actual owner of the property, had listed it for sale, and 
installed a lock box with a key;187 (2) the code for the lockbox was 
given out to approximately 20 agents for showings;188 (3) the tenant 
entered a lease agreement with Heraldo Salinas, an unknown 
individual, who claimed ownership of the property; 189  (4) Mr. 
Salinas was not an owner, manager, or agent of the property and had 
no authority to rent the property;190 (5) tenant claimed Mr. Salinas 
delivered the keys, a lease, and receipts to her upon signing a lease 
agreement 191  and paying him 2-months’ rent; 192  (6) tenant was 
                                                 
184. Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 
3, 2017). 
185 . Eviction Action Complaint at 2, Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 3, 2017). 
186. Answer at 3, Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. 
filed Nov. 15, 2017). 
187 . Eviction Action Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and 
Judgment at 1, Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed 
Dec. 26, 2017). 
188. Id. at 2. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Defendant Jane Doe’s Closing Argument and Affidavit at 1, Wilson v. 
Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 20, 2017). 
192. Id. at 3. 
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never able to contact Mr. Salinas again;193 (7) tenant was defrauded 
by an unknown person;194 and (8) tenant had unlawfully or forcibly 
occupied or taken possession of real property and never held present 
legal right of possession.195 The court determined the tenant never 
had a valid lease agreement with the lawful owners of the 
property196 and the tenant was therefore evicted.197 
This case never involved a lockout petition.198 However, if the 
tenant had been locked out by the real owner, the tenant could have 
then filed a lockout petition. The tenant could have included a copy 
of the lease given to her by the impostor landlord. Under such set of 
facts, the court would have issued an ex parte order199 directing the 
sheriff to ensure possession was restored to the tenant.200 Such an 
ex parte order would be valid in spite of the tenant never holding 
present legal right of possession. While the court could later correct 
the issue of possession, this particular set of facts would have been 
problematic under either the majority’s present legal right of 
possession approach or the dissent’s actual-possession approach. 
This set of facts also illustrates why the extraordinary remedies 
available through the lockout statute should only be cautiously 
dispensed to those who can claim actual possession and not made 
readily available to anyone who only claims to hold present legal 
right of possession.201 
                                                 
193 . Eviction Action Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order and 
Judgment at 2, Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed 
Dec. 26, 2017). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 3. 
196. Id. 
197. Id.at 4. 
198. But see Police Report at 1-3, Wilson v. Doe, 27-CV-HC-17-5278 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 15, 2017) (stating police responded to a call of a 
burglary in progress once landlord’s realtor realized there were unauthorized 
occupants inside the house). 
199. See Minn. Stat. § 504B.375, subd. 1(c) (2017) (stating that if it clearly 
appears from the specific grounds and facts stated in the petition that the 
exclusion or removal was unlawful, the court shall immediately order that the 
residential tenant have possession of the premises). 
200. Id. 
201. See Cocchiarella, 884 N.W.2d at 633 (Anderson J., dissenting) (offering 
that such controversies are better suited for a civil lawsuit where both parties may 
be heard and the relevant disputes resolved). 
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b. When the landlord is unaware that present legal right of 
possession did not transfer from them. 
In three separate tenant remedies actions,202 hundreds of tenants 
are in danger of simultaneous eviction because their landlords’ 
rental licenses were revoked 203  or denied 204  by the City of 
Minneapolis. In each of these cases, the plaintiffs asked the court to 
appoint an administrator to step in and act as a temporary 
landlord.205 The plaintiffs claim the City of Minneapolis is willing 
to issue a provisional rental license to an administrator in order to 
keep tenants in their apartments. If an administrator is not 
appointed, a Minneapolis landlord who lacks a valid rental license 
may not allow any rental building to be occupied and cannot collect, 
accept, or retain rent from any unlicensed rental buildings.206 Any 
unlicensed rental buildings must be ordered to be vacated by the 
City of Minneapolis.207 However, some of the landlords claim to 
still hold valid rental licenses, although the City of Minneapolis 
clearly claims otherwise. 
                                                 
202. Aguilar & Violante v. Misco Holdings, LLC, 27-CV-HC-17-5281 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 3, 2017); IX of Minneapolis v. Khan, 27-CV-HC-
17-5608 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 21, 2017); City of Minneapolis v. 
Equity Residential Holdings, LLC, et al, 27-CV-HC-17-6130 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th 
Dist. filed Dec. 22, 2017). 
203. Max Nesterak, Lack of Affordable Housing has Tenants Fighting to Stay 
in Problem Landlord's Properties, MPR NEWS (Dec. 22, 2017, 11:06 AM), 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/12/22/lack-of-affordable-housing-has-
tenants-fighting-to-stay (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (reporting the landlord lost his 
license to all 42 of his rental properties and the city is forced to vacate all affected 
buildings by Feb. 28). 
204 . Randy Furst, Minneapolis Denies Rental Licenses for 16 Apartment 
Buildings, STAR TRIBUNE (Nov. 8, 2017, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-is-refusing-to-grant-rental-licenses-
for-16-apartment-buildings-sold-by-steve-frenz/456210543/ (last visited Jan. 18, 
2018). 
205. See Petition, Aguilar & Violante v. Misco Holdings, LLC, 27-CV-HC-17-
5281 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 3, 2017); See Petition, IX of 
Minneapolis v. Khan, 27-CV-HC-17-5608 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Nov. 
21, 2017); See Petition, City of Minneapolis v. Equity Residential Holdings, 
LLC, et al, 27-CV-HC-17-6130 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Dec. 22, 2017). 
206. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 12, ch. 244, art. XVI, § 
244.1810 (a) (Dec. 11, 2017).  
207. Id. at § 244.1970. 
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The lack of a valid rental license bars landlords from allowing 
rental buildings to be occupied—effectively preventing them from 
delivering actual possession or granting present legal right of 
possession to any tenants—because an unlicensed landlord does not 
have the ability to create a legal tenancy during any period of time 
they lack a rental license.208 A Minneapolis landlord who lacks a 
valid rental license may not even allow any rental building to be 
occupied by a tenancy at will—where the tenant holds possession 
by permission of the landlord but without a fixed end date—because 
the Minneapolis code bars a landlord who lacks a valid rental 
license from allowing any rental building to be occupied.209 
What if Driggs did not have a valid rental license, but he did not 
know it, and neither did Cocchiarella? Cocchiarella’s petition, 
under the majority’s new definition, would likely be granted and she 
would have an ex parte order to place her in possession of the 
property. The court does not have enough information, at the 
petition stage, to know that Driggs could not legally transfer either 
present legal right of possession nor actual possession.  
Any tenant who contracts with a landlord who lacks a rental 
license cannot hold either actual possession or a present legal right 
of possession, at least in Minneapolis. 210 However, the fact remains 
there are hundreds of tenants currently occupying unlicensed rental 
buildings. If their tenancies were created by contracting with 
unlicensed landlords, then neither the right to hold present legal 
right of possession nor actual possession could legally transfer to 
the tenants. Many other cities and counties around the state have 
similar provisions requiring landlords to obtain either a rental 
license or to register rental property,211 so this potential concern is 
widespread.  
Both the majority and the dissent discussed several 
hypotheticals to either support their interpretation or illustrate why 
the other interpretation was flawed. Notably, their hypotheticals 
were limited only to different lockout scenarios.  However, the new 
sweeping definition of how residential tenants occupy property 
applies to all types of landlord-tenant actions. As the few cases I 
                                                 
208. Id. at § 244.1810 (a).  
209. Minn. Stat. § 504B.001, subd. 13 (2017). 
210. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 12, ch. 244, art. XVI, § 
244.1970 (Dec. 11, 2017). 
211. See supra note 36. 
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discussed illustrate, truth is not only much stranger than fiction, but 
also infinitely more complex. Trial courts must determine the truth 
quickly and, for lockouts and other emergency tenant actions, ex 
parte. The Cocchiarella opinion, by relying on dictionaries to create 
a new legal fiction, left the waters very murky for trial courts, 
landlords, and tenants to navigate through quickly.212 
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
To say someone who never lived in an apartment is still 
occupying an apartment once their move-in date has passed defies 
what it means to have something. An actual-possession definition 
sets aside all concerns about move-in or move-out dates and places 
the focus on who currently lives there. At least for lockout actions, 
where the relief is meant to be extraordinary, such a restrained 
definition makes sense. For any others, there are still other types of 
actions available. 
While courts heavily rely on traditions to promote consistency 
and trust, the overarching principle of achieving justice needs to be 
foremost. This means the courts’ traditions must bend and adapt, 
not to the whims and will of the people, but in response to their 
needs. But as cases move up the levels of courts, the impact of the 
court’s decisions shift dramatically, as they did through 
Cocchiarella. If the court expanded a definition to help achieve a 
just outcome for this case, it did so at the cost of shifting the ground 
for all landlords and tenants throughout the entire state involved in 
all kinds of landlord-tenant actions. Whatever their motivations, this 
change was not needed, was too broad, and its reasoning too 
uncertain for courts to implement effectively. 
And what became of Mary Cocchiarella after this ordeal? Much 
like the duck joke I mentioned earlier, by the time the Minnesota 
Supreme Court announced their land-shifting decision, she had 
long-found another place to live.213 
 
“‘Home,’ he mocked gently. 
‘Yes, what else but home? 
                                                 
212. See supra note 164. 
213. Order for Dismissal, Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 27-CV-HC-14-967 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. 4th Dist. filed Dec. 20, 2016). 
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It all depends on what you mean by home. 
Of course he’s nothing to us, any more than was the hound that came 
a stranger to us out of the woods, worn out upon the trail.’  
‘Home is the place where, when you have to go there, they have to 
take you in.’ 
‘I should have called it something you somehow haven’t to 
deserve.’” 
— Robert Frost, The Death of the Hired Man, 1914.214 
 
                                                 
214. See supra note 1. 
31
Moreno: The Problems of Expanding Landlord-Tenant Law in Minnesota Throug
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
 
Mitchell Hamline Open Access 
Mitchell Hamline Open Access is the digital archive of Mitchell Hamline School of Law. 
Its mission is to preserve and provide access to our scholarly activities, for the benefit of 
researchers and members of the legal community. 




© Mitchell Hamline School of Law 
875 Summit Avenue, Saint Paul, MN 55105 
mitchellhamline.edu 
32
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 39 [2018], Art. 5
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol39/iss1/5
